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1 Introduction
One might expect frictions to be important when trying to explain the determination
of optimal policies since they introduce distortions to the economy which governments
might have an incentive to counteract. Many authors have actually pointed out that
ﬁscal policy should be responsible for dealing with eﬀects of imperfect competition on
eﬃciency.1 ,2 During the last years, there has been an increasing interest in studying
the optimal monetary policy in worlds with imperfect competition and sticky prices.3
However, fewer authors have analyzed the properties of optimal ﬁscal policy under
n o n - c o m p e t i t i v ef r a m e w o r k s .A sf a ra sw ek n o w ,t h e r ea r eo n l yt w op a p e r sa n a l y z i n g
optimal ﬁscal policy issues and assuming that the private markets do not function
well. The papers by Judd (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999) allow for imperfectly
competitive product markets and study the sign of steady-state optimal tax rate on
capital income in a neoclassical growth model.
Our paper characterizes the optimal policy implemented by a planner who decides
about the provision of a public good and about the funding of its spending by labor
income taxes and debt. We also compare the dynamic properties of the optimal alloca-
tions in four diﬀerent theoretical settings. On the one hand, we ﬁrst consider that there
is perfect competition in all markets and then we assume that a union with monopoly
power sets wages. On the other hand, we introduce another source of imperfection by
considering that the menu of assets available to the government may be constrained:
as opposed to the case in which state contingent debt can be purchased (complete
1“In models with such imperfections, optimal policy must be responsive to the eﬃciency consider-
ations we have emphasized, but also must attempt to cure the private markets imperfection” Chari
and Kehoe (1999).
2“We are convinced that the central task of monetary policy is to mitigate the eﬀects of nominal
inertia, while ﬁscal policy assumes responsability for oﬀsetting distortions associated with imperfect
competition”. Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
3For instance, Rottemberg and Woodford (1998), Goodfriend and King (1997) or Erceg, Henderson
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markets), we also consider an economy where the government can issue only risk free
debt (incomplete markets).
We present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in the spirit of Lucas
and Stokey (1983). This paper applies the formulation in Ramsey (1927) to study the
structure and time consistency of ﬁscal and monetary policy in an stochastic economy
without capital. A number of papers have further examined and extended the theo-
retical framework presented by Lucas and Stokey. Major contributions are the articles
by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991, 1994), Zhu (1992) and Marcet, Sargent and
Seppälä (1999). These papers are important references for us from the methodological
point of view. Apart from the papers mentioned at the beginning of this introduction,
there are other articles closely related to the issue we address. Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1994) present a model with capital and exogenous government spending and
analyze how ﬁscal policy should be set over the business cycle. Rojas (1993) studies
how should public investment and capital income taxes be correlated with output in a
model without debt.
Closed form solutions are not available for the models we present in this paper.
Therefore, we compute numerically the equilibrium stochastic processes for the policy
variables. Under the assumptions we make, the optimal policy is time inconsistent.
However, since discussing time inconsistency issues is not the aim of this paper, we
only consider the full-commitment solution. We assume that there is a technology
t h r o u g hw h i c ht h ep l a n n e rc a nc o m m i ti t s e l ft oi m p l e m e n ti nt h ef u t u r et h ep o l i c yi t
announces today.
We ﬁnd that the cyclical properties of the optimal policy are basically the same
for the four settings studied: optimal government spending is procyclical and public
expenditure to output ratio should be constant over time; the labor income tax rate
should be smaller during expansions but this tax rate should ﬂuctuate very little.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 3
When comparing the optimal policies for the diﬀerent frameworks, we conclude
that the size of the government, measured as the public spending to output ratio,
should be smaller in the models assuming imperfect competition in the labor market.
The existence of a union with monopoly power introduces a new distortion into a
competitive economy that partially funds its public spending with distorting taxes.
The planner’s optimal reaction implies providing less public good and ﬁnancing a larger
proportion of its expenses through non-distorting debt. Finally, the main results do
not seem to depend on the constraints imposed on the set of assets available to the
government. Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that under incomplete markets for the debt, the
economy will be further from the eﬃcient (ﬁrst best) allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we assume that the government
can issue state contingent debt; we set the basic theoretical setup and consider two
models, the competitive one in which both the worker and the ﬁrm are price takers in
the labor market, and the non-competitive model in which we assume that there is a
union which sets wages; we solve the model numerically and analyze the properties of
the equilibrium optimal allocations. Section 3 performs the same exercise but assuming
that only risk-free debt is available to the government. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The model with state contingent debt
We study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We consider a production
economy with ﬁrms, inﬁnitely-lived consumers, and a government. There is a private
consumption good (ct) and a public good (gt)t h a ts a t i s f y
ct + gt = yt (1)Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 4
where yt is the aggregate production. The available production technology can be
represented through a constant returns to scale concave production function:4
yt = f(θt;1− xt,` t) (2)
where xt denotes leisure, `t is land and θt is a productivity shock following a Markov
process:




The representative ﬁrm rents labor and land from households and uses technology
(2) to produce output. The ﬁrm seeks to maximize its proﬁts,
πt = yt − wt(1 − xt) − p
`
t`t (4)
where wt,t h ew a g er a t e ,a n dp`
t, the land price, are given to the ﬁrm. The solution to
the problem of the ﬁrm implies that inputs inverse demands equal the corresponding
marginal productivity, that is,
wt(·) ≡ f1−x(θt;·,` t) (5)
p
`
t(·) ≡ f`(θt;1− xt,.) (6)
where f1−x and f` are the derivatives of the production function with respect to labor
a n dl a n dr e s p e c t i v e l y .
4In Lucas and Stokey (1983) a linear production function is assumed, that is, labor’s share in
income equals one. Since the reward to labor is equal to total output and there are no rents allocated
to other activities, a union with market power plays no role in this framework. In order for the
unionize economy to make sense, we assume a production technology showing decreasing returns to
scale to labor input.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 5
Households
Consumers derive utility from private consumption, public spending and leisure.





t u(ct,g t,x t), 0 < β < 1 (7)
The utility function u is strictly increasing in the three arguments and strictly concave.
The representative household is endowed with one unit of time which is devoted
to work and leisure. He also owns ` units of land that will be inelastically supplied.
Besides, the household can lend to or borrow from the government with a full array of
contingent one-period bonds that complete the markets. The representative household





t(θ)bt(θ)dθ =( 1− τt)wt(1 − xt)+bt−1(θt)+p
`
t`t (8)
where τt is the labor income tax rate; pb
t(θ) denotes the price the household has to
pay in period t to get one unit of consumption good at t +1if the productivity shock
realization is θ at this time and bt(θ) is the number of units of debt (contingent on θ)
held in period t.
We assume that there is perfect competition in the goods market, in the land market
and in the contingent claims market. However, we are going to consider two diﬀerent
t y p e so fb e h a v i o rf o rt h ec o n s u m e ri nt h el a b o rm a r k e t .F i r s t ,w ea s s u m ew o r k e r sa r e
price takers in the labor market. And then, we consider that there is a union with
monopoly power in the labor market. Workers assign this union to bargain with the
ﬁrm. Since the union has monopoly power in the wage bargain, it will set the wage
and then employment will be chosen by the ﬁrm.
GovernmentShould Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 6
The government provides the public consumption good and ﬁnances its expenditures
by labor income taxes and public debt. The government budget constraint is the
following:5





The government is assumed to be a benevolent social planner whose objective is to
choose a ﬁscal policy in order to maximize the welfare of the economy. The government
is aware of the household’s answer to policy announcements and takes this reaction
into account when it solves its maximization problem. This is what has been called
a Ramsey problem in the literature. In other words, the planner chooses the optimal
policy among allocations fulﬁlling the following restrictions: the temporal sequence
of budget constraints (9), the feasibility constraint (1) and the ﬁrst order conditions
resulting from the programs solved by the other agents in the economy.
When choosing the optimal policy the planner faces diﬀerent trade-oﬀs. First, there
is a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts and the costs of larger government spending. Con-
sumers derive utility from the publicly provided good and, therefore, higher welfare
could be achieved by increasing government expenses. On the cost side, this public
g o o di sn o tf r e ea n di th a st ob eﬁnanced through distorting taxes or through debt.
These funding decisions involve another trade-oﬀ for the policy maker. Larger tax
rates have adverse incentive eﬀects because they distort labor supply decisions. When
maximizing welfare the planner tries to avoid these distortions using debt as funding
instrument. However, ﬁnancing spending by debt also involves a cost: larger indebt-
edness today will generate higher debt obligations to be payed in the future and, in
the end, interests on public assets will have to be payed through taxes. As our plan-
ner solves an intertemporal and stochastic problem, it will try to smooth distortions
5We assume that there are high enough debt limits to prevent the possibility of a Ponzi game.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 7
minimizing ﬂuctuations in taxes both over time and across states of nature. Besides,
it is also important to note that since future utility has a smaller weight in the welfare
function, it will be better, in terms of welfare, to set smoother tax rates in the short
run and to allow larger ﬂuctuations in the far future. As Marcet and Scott (2001) point
out, in such a framework, it is optimal to shift “volatility in taxes to the very far future
using debt for this purpose”.
The following two subsections describe and solve the household’s problem and the
Ramsey problem in the competitive labor market framework and in the non-competitive
one.
2.1 The competitive model
In this subsection we assume that both the consumer and the ﬁrm are price-takers in
t h eg o o d sa n di nt h ei n p u t sm a r k e t s .
The household’s problem is to choose {ct,b t(θ),x t,` t} maximizing the discounted
sum of utilities given by (7) subject to the temporal sequence of budget constraints (8)
and taking {τt,g t,b −1,θt,p b
t(θ),w t,p `
t}a sg i v e n .T h eﬁrst order conditions with respect






Pr(θt+1 = θ \ θt) (10)




where uct and uxt are the marginal utility of consumption and leisure respectively. The
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We deﬁne the competitive equilibrium allocations as follows:
Deﬁnition 1: Given b−1 and the productivity shock process {θt},acompetitive equi-
librium is a stochastic process for prices {pb
t(θ),w t,p `
t}, allocations {ct,b t(θ),x t,` t} and
ﬁscal policy {gt,τt,b t(θ)} such that:
i) {ct,b t(θ),x t,` t} maximizes the consumer’s objective function (7) subject to the
budget constraints (8) given {pb
t(θ),w t,p `
t} and {gt,τt}.
ii) {xt,` t} maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁts (4) given {wt,p `
t}.
iii) The government budget constraint (9) and the economy’s technology constraint
(1) are satisﬁed at each period.
iv) The labor, land, consumption goods and bonds markets clear.
As it has been already pointed out, the Ramsey problem consists of maximizing the
objective function (7) over the competitive equilibria deﬁned above. It is easy to see
that this problem is not a recursive one because future choice variables appear in the
constraints of the government at time t. As a result, traditional dynamic programming
techniques can not be adopted to solve the problem and the optimal policy will be time
inconsistent.6 Previous papers have used diﬀerent strategies to ﬁnd recursive formula-
tions. In this section we adopt the approach proposed by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1991). We can prove that competitive equilibrium allocations can be characterized






t {uc,t [f1−x,t(1 − xt) − gt] − ux,t(1 − xt)} (13)
6As mentioned in the Introduction, we only consider the full commitment solution. See Lucas and
Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Stokey (1991) for discussion on time consistency of public
policies.
7The proposition and proof showing this characterization can be found in Appendix A.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 9
This equation is the result of substituting out prices and policies in the government
budget constraints using the ﬁrst order conditions of the household’s problem and of the
ﬁrm’s problem. By characterizing the set of feasible (potentially optimal) allocations
by these two constraints (1) and (13), we recover a recursive structure for the problem
from period 1 onwards.8












t {uc,t [f1−x,t(1 − xt) − gt] − ux,t(1 − xt)}
ct + gt = f(θt;1− xt,`)
θ0,b −1 given
If an optimal policy exists and the solution is interior, the optimal allocations must
satisfy the government problem’s ﬁrst order conditions with respect to leisure and
government spending, the resource constraint (1) and the implementability constraint
(13). These necessary conditions can be written as equations of the form F(zt,θt;λ)=
0 t>0,w h e r ezt is a vector of endogenous variables and λ is the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the implementability constraint (13).9 Hence, we can conclude that the
optimal ﬁscal policy only depends on the contemporaneous productivity shock θt and
the multiplier λ, and it has the same correlation properties as the former. We can







8If b−1 6=0 , a time invariant policy function can only be found from period 1 forward. A diﬀerent
policy function will be computed for period 0.
9The systems of equations with the ﬁrst order conditions and the procedure we have followed to
solve the studied models can be found in Appendix B.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 10
2.2 The non-competitive model
Now we introduce some imperfection into the model above. We assume that there is a
union which has an eﬀective monopoly on the sale of labor to the ﬁrm. It is supposed
that workers assign the union to bargain with the ﬁrm. However, due to its monopoly
power, the union chooses wages on its own with no bargaining. The labor allocation
will be demand determined.10 The optimal behavior of a representative household
can be characterized by the maximization of the objective function (7) subject to the
sequence of budget constraints (8) and taking {τt,g t,b −1,θt,p b
t(θ),p `
t} and the ﬁrm’s
inverse labor demand (5) as given. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to debt
holdings and the transversality constraint will be the same as in the competitive labor
market case, that is, (10) and (12) respectively. The ﬁrst order condition with respect
to leisure is slightly diﬀerent now:
(1 − τt)[wt(·)+w
0
t(·)(1 − xt)] =
ux,t
uc,t
We can rewrite this expression as follows:
(1 − τt)wt =
ux,t
uc,t
(1 + mt) (14)
where mt is the positive mark-up the union gets due to the monopoly power it has in
the labor market.11 This equation shows that the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption is not equal to the marginal rate of transformation, not only
because of the labor income tax rate but also because of this mark-up.
10We assume that the union only cares about worker’s interest and it does not take into account
the eﬀect of its wage policy on land owner’s income. This modelization of the union’s behavior is also
presented in Dixon (2000).
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The following deﬁnition characterizes the equilibrium with imperfect competition
allocations over which the government maximizes its objective function:
Deﬁnition 2: Given b−1 and the productivity shock process {θt},a nequilibrium
with imperfect competition is a stochastic process for prices {pb
t(θ),w t,p `
t}, allocations
{ct,b t(θ),x t,` t} and ﬁscal policy {gt,τt,b t(θ)} such that:
i) {ct,b t(θ),x t,` t} maximizes the consumer’s objective function (7) subject to the
budget constraints (8) given {pb
t(θ),p `
t} and {gt,τt} and the ﬁrm’s labor-demand
curve wt(·).
ii) {xt,` t} maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁts (4) given {wt,p `
t}.
iii) The government budget constraint (9) and the economy’s technology constraint
(1) are satisﬁed at each period.
iv) The labor, land, consumption goods and bonds markets clear.
As in the competitive case, we can also prove that equilibrium allocations can be






t {uc,t [f1−x,t(1 − xt) − gt] − ux,t(1 + mt)(1 − xt)} (15)
Hence, the Ramsey planner will select, among allocations satisfying the resource
constraint and this new implementability constraint, those allocations that yield the
highest utility for the government, that is, that maximize (7). Then, from this prob-
lem’s ﬁrst order conditions with respect to leisure and government expenditure we get
the equations we have to solve, jointly with the implementability constraint, in orderShould Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 12
to ﬁnd the optimal paths for the endogenous variables. Again, these paths can be








We are interested in studying the dynamic equilibrium allocations for the models de-
scribed in the previous section. Since closed form solutions are not available, we solve
the model using numerical simulations. We specify the following functional forms for
the production function and the preferences. We assume a Cobb-Douglas technology:
f(θt;1− xt,` t)=θt(1 − xt)
γ`
1−γ
t 0 < γ < 1












0 < α < 1
We are considering that utility depends on a composite consumption index which in-
cludes both the privately and the publicly provided good.
We also have to specify values for the parameters appearing in the model. The
parameterization we consider is quite similar to that used in the real business cycle lit-
erature. We use parameter values (β,α,σ1,σ2,γ,ρ,σε)=(0.95,0.8,3,2,0.66,0.95,0.01).12
Besides, we assume that b−1 =0 .
After computing the equilibrium paths, we ﬁrst analyze the cyclical properties of
t h ee n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e sa n dt h e nw ec o m p a r et h er e s u l t sf o rt h ec o m p e t i t i v ea n dt h e
non-competitive economy. The analysis of the descriptive statistics computed for the
optimal policy allows us to reach one of the main conclusions in the literature of optimal
12Our aim is to study if imperfections in the labor market justify a diﬀerent optimal ﬁscal policy
and not so much to match the observed data. That is why we did not calibrate the economy as well
as possible to the data. Our main ﬁndings are robust to changes in parameterization.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 13
taxation: optimal taxes on labor income ﬂuctuate very little (the standard deviation of
this variable is 0.002 in the competitive case and 0.003 in the non-competitive model).
The standard deviation of the government spending is much higher (0.04 in the com-
petitive model and 0.03 in the non competitive). And the ﬁscal variable that seems
to be more volatile is contingent debt payments (0.14 in the competitive framework
versus 0.26 in the non-competitive). Therefore, it is optimal to smooth labor taxes
across states and state contingent returns on debt will be used as shocks absorbers.
We can also analyze our results computing the impulse response functions for the
decision rules. For the simulated series, we run regressions of the endogenous vari-
ables against {εt−s}L
s=0,b e i n gε the innovation of the technological variable θ.F i g u r e
1 displays the estimated coeﬃcients for the competitive economy and for the non-
competitive one. This analysis allows us to study the eﬀect of an unexpected shock
to the technology on future variables. The qualitative results are the same for the
two models studied: an unexpected positive shock to the technology, that is, an un-
expectedly high technology variable has a positive eﬀe c to nb o t hp r i v a t ea n dp u b l i c
consumption. We may say that the government spending is a procyclical variable in the
sense that it should be larger the larger the technology variable. This result should not
be surprising given the assumptions and functional forms considered in these models.
Provided that in our economy there are no externalities and that recessions are only
caused by bad shocks to technology, the behavior of private and public consumption
over the business cycle should be basically the same. When the technology variable
is high, the larger amount of resources are optimally devoted to increase both private
consumption and public expenditure. But, perhaps, if we want to discuss the procycli-
cality of government spending we should study not the level of public spending but
the public expenditure to output ratio. The graph displaying the impulse response
function for this ratio shows that the eﬀect of a shock to the technology is negligible.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 14
This ratio should actually be constant over the cycle. That is, the optimal level of
government spending should increase as much as output during expansions.13
With respect to the funding of government spending, labor income taxes distort
economic decisions and it will be optimal to minimize these distortions over time.
Graphs in Figure 1, show that, if the state of the technology is better than expected,
the planner reduces the labor income tax rate. Due to the increase in the tax base,
the planner raises larger revenues even setting smaller tax rates. However, the optimal
increase in tax revenues is smaller than the rise in public consumption. As a result,
deﬁcit also increases. Further cuts in taxes are not optimal because larger primary
deﬁcits ﬁnanced through debt today would involve larger ineﬃcient tax rates tomorrow.
Papers like Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) ﬁnd it
optimal to run deﬁcits in bad times and surpluses during good times. Although one may
think that we ﬁnd the opposite result, in essence, the policy strategy we recommend
is the same: in order to avoid large volatility of tax rates, the optimal policy involves
running higher deﬁcits the higher the public expenditure.14
Comparing the conclusions of the competitive and the non-competitive model is
also an interesting exercise. In order to understand the diﬀerences in the results of
the two models, it is useful to study the ﬁrst order conditions of the household prob-
lem concerning the labor supply decisions, that is, equations (11) and (14). In both
models, labor taxes are driving a wedge between marginal rates of substitution and
marginal rates of transformation and, therefore, distorting consumption-leisure deci-
13This result is robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the relationship between private and public
consumption in the utility function. We have only been able to overturn it by assuming preferences that
imply a wealth-varying intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Considering a Stone-Geary function
for preferences results in optimal government spending to output ratio increasing with the technology
variable.
14In their models public expenditure is an exogenous variable and a recession is a period when this
expenditure is high. On the contrary, we assume that the government decides about its spending and
we ﬁnd that it provides less public good during recessions, which in our model occurs because there
is a bad shock to the technology.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 15
sions. But in the non-competitive model, we have an additional source of distortion:
the mark-up that households obtain because their unions set wages. Reaching the ﬁrst
best allocation implies setting labor taxes equal to zero in the competitive economy
and implementing labor subsidies equal to the mark-up in the unionized economy. Ob-
viously, none of these policies is feasible because it is optimal to provide a positive
public spending. So, to counteract the eﬀect of a positive mark up, the government
in the unionize economy ﬁnds it optimal to set smaller tax rates. Additionally, this
planner provides less public good (both in levels and as a proportion of output) and
ﬁnances a larger proportion of this expenditure issuing debt. The reason for these
diﬀerences in the use of debt is that, due to the existence of additional rigidities, the
incentive to shift more distorting policies to far future is larger for the planner in the
non-competitive model. Impulse-response functions displayed in Figure 1 conﬁrm the
intuition about the diﬀerences in the reaction of planners in the two models. When
the technology variable is unexpectedly high, both planners increase public spending
but the rise is higher in the competitive case. Besides, in order to reduce distortions,
the planner in the non-competitive economy decides to cut taxes even more than the
‘competitive government’. Consequently, the increase in primary deﬁcit will be larger
in the unionized economy.
As suggested above, the equilibrium allocations for the non-competitive economy
will be further from the ﬁrst best. This result is illustrated in Table 1. This table
presents the ﬁrst best allocations15 and the mean of the series computed for the
diﬀerent models studied.
15The ﬁrst best allocation is computed as that implemented by a planner who ﬁnances the public
good provision by non-distorting lump sum taxes.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 16
3 The incomplete markets model
The contingent debt assumption made in the preceding section is useful because it
makes equilibria easier to compute. Moreover, since most of the papers in the literature
have adopted this assumption, it is also interesting to solve the model in the preceding
section for comparability purposes. However, the debt pattern observed in the complete
markets case is not very interesting. In this model, debt can be represented by a time-
invariant function of the productivity shock. That is, given a state θt today, the
government always purchases the same quantity of bonds contingent on each possible
state of nature tomorrow. And these debt issues do not depend, for instance, on
outstanding debt obligations. We conjecture that more interesting results may be
obtained if a diﬀerent debt structure is considered. Moreover, we think that the results
we have got may be biased by the complete markets assumption. With complete
markets for the debt, agents purchase bonds in order to “insure” themselves against
any contingency it may occur. The consumer buys this contingent debt and knows that
if a bad shock happens tomorrow, debt payments will be larger. The government does
not provide more public goods in bad times because the tax required to ﬁnance this
expenditure should be too large and it is not worth introducing such a big distortion
in the economy. To some extent, this stabilizer role is fulﬁlled by the non-distorting
contingent debt.
In this section we are going to present two models with the same features as those
in section 2 but now assuming that the only debt in this economy is risk-free debt. Due




tbt =( 1− τt)wt(1 − xt)+bt−1 + p
`
t`t (16)
Therefore, the consumer buys today the right to receive bt units of consumptionShould Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 17
good tomorrow no matter the state of nature. In the incomplete market setup we
bound the debt market imposing debt limit constraints16 ,t h a ti s ,
M ≤ bt ≤ M
As in the model presented above, the consumer maximizes the objective function
(7) subject to his budget constraint (16). The ﬁrst order condition resulting from the
derivative with respect to leisure is the same as in the complete markets case, i.e. (11)
in the competitive model and (14) in the non-competitive one. Again, the consumer
supplies inelastically his land endowment. Finally, the other necessary conditions are:







The ﬁrm’s problem remains the same as in the complete markets framework. The
ﬁrst order conditions resulting from this problem imply that inverse demand of each
input equals the corresponding marginal productivity.
Finally, the Ramsey planner sets the ﬁscal policy that maximizes the consumer’s
objective function taking into account how the consumer reacts to these policy an-
nouncements. Again, as when state-contingent debt was assumed, the planner’s prob-
lem can not be written as a time invariant dynamic program. Moreover, we can not
follow the same approach as before in order to recover a recursive formulation. Under
complete markets for the debt, we got the required recursive structure after proving
that competitive equilibrium allocations could be characterized by two equations, i.e.
the implementability constraint and the resource condition. Nevertheless, as it is shown
in Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (1999) this does not happen in the incomplete markets
16As it is explained in Chari and Kehoe (1999) this assumption is required “to ensure that the
problem is well posed”. See Marcet and Scott (2001) for further discussion to justify the use of debt
limits under incomplete markets.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 18
setup anymore. Under risk-free debt, additional restrictions are needed to characterize
potentially optimal allocations. Instead of the implementability constraint (13), the





j {uc,t+j [f1−x,t+j(1 − xt+j) − gt+j] − ux,t+j(1 − xt+j)},t ≥ 0 (18)
Using this result, the optimal policy could be characterized as that maximizing
the sum of discounted utilities (7) over the set of allocations satisfying the resource
constraint and the above sequence of equations (18). And the Lagrangian for the









f(θt;1− xt,`) − gt,g t,xt
i













where µt is the time varying Lagrange multiplier associated with the time t imple-
mentability constraint, and υ1t and υ2t are the multipliers associated with the debt
constraints.
Note that under this formulation, this is still a non-recursive problem. Hence, the
method used in section 2 no longer yields a recursive structure. The alternative strat-
egy we follow is the ‘recursive contracts’ approach described in Marcet and Marimon
17Some intuition about why Ramsey allocations have to satisfy additional constraints when only
risk free debt is available can be found in Appendix A. See Marcet, Sargent and Sepälä (1999, p. 7-8)
for a formal proposition and proof showing this result.





j {uc,t+j [f1−x,t+j(1 − xt+j) − gt+j] − ux,t+j(1 + mt+j)(1 − xt+j)}Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 19
(1995). Including a time varying Lagrange multiplier as a state variable of the problem,
standard methods can be used to ﬁnd time invariant decision rules. This approach is
also adopted by Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (1999) to compute optimal policies under






t {u(ct,g t,xt) − ψtuc,t [τtwt(1 − xt) − gt]
+ µtuc,tbt−1 + υ1t(M − bt)+υ2t(bt − M)
o
where
ψt = ψt−1 + µt ψ−1 =0 (20)
Taking derivatives we get the system of ﬁrst order conditions we have to solve to
ﬁnd the decision rules for the endogenous variables (ct,xt,g t,τt,pb
t,bt,
wt,p `
t,υ1t,υ2t).19 Now the optimal paths will be time invariant functions of three state
variables (ψt−1,b t−1,θt).
We have also computed the impulse response functions for the decision rules when
the return on debt is not state contingent. Figure 2 displays these impulse response
functions. The analysis of the series computed in this section leads to similar con-
clusions to those found under complete debt markets. Again, the optimal level of
government spending to output ratio should be roughly constant over time. If an un-
expected positive shock to the technology happens, the government will ﬁnd it optimal
to increase public spending, to reduce labor tax rates and to increase revenues raised
through debt sales. There are two new endogenous variables that we can study when
19See Appendix B for a description of the system of equations and some references and details about
the method followed to compute the solution.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 20
we include risk-free debt in the model: excess burden of taxation and debt purchases.
Deadweight loss of taxation could be measured by the time invariant Lagrange mul-
tiplier λ under complete markets for the contingent debt. Now, in the incomplete
markets case, this excess burden, measured by the multiplier ψt,i st i m ev a r y i n g .T h i s
variable can be interpreted as a sort of shadow price. It indicates the cost of public
expenditure due to the use of distorting taxes to fund it. The absolute value of ψt
is larger during expansions. Therefore, the cost of raising revenues through taxes is
higher in good times. As regards debt, in the complete markets setting, we could only
compute debt payments, and this variable reacted negatively to a non-expected positive
shock to the technology. When incomplete markets are assumed, debt purchases are
always positive and increase with the technology variable. Notice that our conjecture
about the eﬀect of removing state contingent debt is not conﬁrmed. As also found in
Marcet and Scott (2001), the size of debt is now used to avoid volatility in taxes.20
As a result, larger debt issues are observed during periods in which more public good
is supplied and debt will be a highly persistent variable.
Comparisons between the competitive and the unionized economy draw the same
conclusions as in the complete markets framework. The distortion in the labor mar-
ket leads the government to provide less public good, in levels and as a proportion of
output, and to ﬁnance its expenses mostly with non-distorting debt. The main diﬀer-
ences between the two frameworks come from the variables related to the funding of
government expenditures. When we assume that wages are set by the union, a positive
unexpected shock to the technology causes optimal debt to increase more and optimal
labor income tax rate to be smaller than in the competitive case. The government in
the non-competitive model takes advantage of the good state of the technology to re-
duce distortions in the economy. Thus, the planner increases public expenses and debt
20Note that the optimal reaction of tax rates to an unexpected shock to the technology is almost
equal in size both under complete and incomplete markets.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 21
issues in such a way that a reduction in distortions through a smaller labor income tax
rate is achieved. The means of the simulated series conﬁrm this intuition: government
spending to output ratio is 0.19 under competitive markets and 0.18 in the economy
with a union setting wages; the percentage of government revenues raised through la-
bor taxes is 35% in the non competitive model versus 54% in the competitive one; and
the deadweight loss of taxation is three times larger in the unionized economy (-0.36
versus -0.12 in the competitive economy).
Finally, the non-existence of markets for contingent claims is a market failure. So
the planner seeking to maximize welfare takes also an active role in ameliorating the
eﬀects of market incompleteness. But this new imperfection makes eﬃciency be more
diﬃcult to attain for the government. Our results agree with this intuition. Table 1
s h o w st h a ta l l o c a t i o n sa r ef u r t h e rf r o mt h eﬁr s tb e s tw h e nt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nn o t
issue state-contingent debt.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper studies if imperfections in the labor market justify a diﬀerent optimal ﬁscal
policy. We ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy should not be countercyclical. Actually, when solving
a Ramsey problem we ﬁnd that optimality requires constant government spending as
a proportion of output. We also conclude that the optimal size of the government
is smaller when we introduce imperfect competition into the basic model. The main
results are also found when incomplete asset markets are assumed.
This paper has shown that the adopted approach allows us to do proper study and
that it is ﬂexible enough to characterize optimal ﬁscal policies in economies where mar-
kets are not perfectly competitive. However, assumptions as focusing on supply shocks,
considering additional ineﬃciencies (unionized labor market) that reinforce the existing
ones (taxes) or lack of capital may imply limitations of our results. Further studies in-Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 22
cluding new assumptions along these lines would be an interesting and valuable future
research.
Appendix A
In this appendix we prove a proposition that states that when the return on debt is state
contingent and complete debt markets are assumed, competitive equilibrium allocations
can be characterized just by the feasibility constraint (1) and the implementability
constraint (13). After proving the proposition , we will give some intuition about why
we should include additional constraints when characterizing competitive equilibria
under non-state contingent debt markets.
Proposition 1 Given b−1, θ0, and the conditional distribution of future technology,
any process for {ct,x t} that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium by some
policy {τt,g t,b t(θ)} must satisfy (1) and (13). Moreover, any allocation that satisﬁes
(1) and (13) can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. First we are going to prove that a competitive equilibrium allocation
have to satisfy the implementability constraint (13).21 From the government budget
constraint (9) we have:





Using equations (10) and (11) from the ﬁrst order conditions of the household’s problem
and equation (5) from the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem, we can substitute
out prices (wt,pb













21Note that the feasibility constraint (1) is fulﬁlled by deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 23























{uc,t+j [f1−x,t+j(1 − xt+j) − gt+j] − ux,t+j(1 − xt+j)}
Considering t =0we have condition (13).
To prove the reverse implication, we proceed as follows: given b−1 and a process for
{ct,x t,θt} that satisfy the feasibility constraint (1) and the implementability constraint







allocations bt(θ) that constitute a competitive equilibrium.
From {ct,x t,θt} and the feasibility constraint we get {gt}. The wage rate and the land
price will be determined by equations (5) and (6) respectively, and the debt price will
be pinned down by (10). The labor income tax rate can be obtained from (11). And









κt+j /θt+1 = θ

 (A1)
We can prove that each allocation {ct,g t,x t} satisfying condition (13) will fulﬁll the
government budget constraint (9) for contingent debt deﬁn e da si nt h ee q u a t i o na b o v e
and for t>0. From the equation above, we know that:
22We can drop subscripts on θ because this equation holds for all possible state of the technology,





































And applying the law of iterated expectations we have:



















The implementability constraint (13) guarantees that the government budget constraint
h o l d sa tt i m e0 .
What is diﬀerent when we assume that the only asset available to the govern-
ment is risk-free debt? In this case, we need to impose additional constraints in order
to construct a competitive equilibria satisfying that the return on debt is not state
contingent. We can prove, for the incomplete markets case, a proposition similar to
Proposition 1. The ﬁrst part of the proof is basically the same as that presented above.
But when constructing a competitive equilibria using allocations {ct,x t,θt} that sat-
isfy some suﬃcient conditions, we obtain debt allocations using an equation which is









κt+j /θt+1 = θ

 (A2)Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 25
Note that, since debt is not state contingent, allocations {ct,x t,θt} have to be such
that the right hand side of this equation is the same for all possible states of the
technology at time t+1, θt+1. And the requirement that allocations {ct,x t,θt} satisfy
the resource constraint (1) and an implementability constraint (13) only guarantees
that this is true for t = −1. We will only be able to construct a competitive equilibrium
with non-state contingent return on debt if we assume that allocations {ct,x t,θt} fulﬁll
an implementability constraint (18) for each period t.
Appendix B
This appendix describes the systems of equations that characterize the optimal allo-
cations for the models presented in sections 2 and 3 and the methods we have used to
compute the equilibrium paths for the endogenous variables.
The model with state contingent debt
The Ramsey problem ﬁrst order conditions with respect to leisure and government
spending can be written as:
−uc,tf1−x,t + ux,t + λΩ1t =0 (B1)
−uc,t + ug,t + λΩ2t =0 (B2)
where:
Ω1t = ucc,tf1−x,t [f1−x,t(1 − xt) − gt] − uc,tf1−x1−x,t(1 − xt)
+uc,tf1−x,t + uxx,t(1 − xt)(1 + mt) − ux,t(1 + mt)
+ux,tmx,t(1 − xt)
Ω2t = uc,t +( ucc,t − ucg,t)[f1−x,t(1 − xt) − gt]Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 26
with mt =
f1−x,t
f1−x,t+f1−x1−x,t(1−xt) and mx,t being the derivative of the mark-up with respect
to leisure. For the competitive model, both the mark-up and its derivative are equal
to zero.
Therefore, optimal values for the endogenous variables (ct,x t,g t,τt,p b
t(θ),b t(θ),p `
t,w t)
can be characterized by equations (B1),(B2), the feasibility constraint (1), the imple-
mentability constraint (13) (or (15) in the non-competitive model) and the ﬁrst order
conditions of the household problem, (10) and (11) (or (14) for the unionize economy),
and the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm problem, (5) and (6).
We use the following procedure to compute the solution. We start with a given
government initial indebtedness b−1 and a realization for the technology shock {θt}T
t=0.
Then, assuming a ﬁxed value for the Lagrange multiplier λ associated with the im-
plementability constraint we solve equations (1),(B1),(B2). We obtain an allocation
{ct,x t,g t} that solves the ﬁrst order conditions for this particular realization of the
productivity shock. The other endogenous variables are determined from the ﬁrst or-
der conditions of the household’s problem and the ﬁrm’s problem.23 If we repeat this
procedure using N diﬀerent realizations of the shock, we get the N equilibrium paths
for the endogenous variables given these shock sequences. Next, we average across
these N realizations to approximate the expectation in the right-hand side of the im-
plementability constraint (13) (or (15) in the non-competitive case). If this average
is diﬀerent from b−1 we change the proposed λ and iterate until the implementability
constraint is satisﬁed.
The incomplete markets model
When we assume that the only asset available to the government is risk free debt
the ﬁrst order conditions of the Ramsey problem with respect to leisure, government
23The wage rate, wt, will be equal to the labor marginal revenue and the price of land will be equal
to the marginal productivity of land. The debt price will be determined by (10). Labor income tax
rate, τt, is pinned down by (11) in the competitive case and (14) in the non-competitive model.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 27
spending and debt holdings can be written as:
−uc,tf1−x,t + ux,t + ψtΩ1t − µtucc,tbt−1f1−x,t =0 (B3)
−uc,t + ug,t + ψtΩ2t − µt(ucc,t − ucg,t)bt−1 =0 (B4)





where Ω1t and Ω2t are the expressions appearing in the ﬁrst order conditions calculated
for the complete markets case.
The system of equations we have to solve in order to ﬁnd the optimal allocations for
the endogenous variables, (ct,xt,g t,τt,pb
t,bt,wt,p `
t,υ1t,υ2t), includes the three equations
above (B3)-(B5), the feasibility constraint (1), the ﬁrst order conditions of the house-
hold problem, (17) and (11) or (14), the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm problem, (5)
and (6), and the following constraints:
ψt = ψt−1 + µt (B6)




υ1,t(M − bt)=υ2,t(bt − M)=0 (B8)
(M − bt),(bt − M) ≥ 0 υ1,t,υ2,t ≤ 0 (B9)
We have used the parameterized expectations approach (PEA) for solving these
systems. This method replaces the conditional expectation in these equations with
an approximating function depending on the state variables and a set of parameters.
Then, the equilibrium allocations are simulated using this function in place of the
conditional expectations. An iterative procedure leads to a parameterization of the
expectations that its consistent with the series it generates. More details about thisShould Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 28
method can be found in Marcet (1988), Den Haan and Marcet (1990) and Marcet and
Marshall (1994).





,24 and the vector of state variables is st =( θt,ψt−1,b t−1).W e h a v e
replaced these expectations with the functions ϕ1(δ















n0 are polynomials of degree n and n0 respectively and δ
1 and δ
2
are the coeﬃcients in these polynomials25 . We can distinguish diﬀerent steps followed
to ﬁnd the solution of PEA:
• Step 1: Substitute the conditional expectations in the system of equations with
the functions ϕ1(δ
1,s t) and ϕ2(δ




• Step 2: Create a long series for the technological shock θt and solve for the
endogenous variables for every period. Under perfect competition in the labor
market,26 the endogenous variables can be obtained as follows: we can distinguish
between periods in which debt limits are not binding (unconstrained periods)a n d
periods in which these limits bind (constrained periods).
— For unconstrained periods, since debt limits are not binding υ1t and υ2t will
be equal to zero. Then from (B5) and (B6) we calculate ψt and µt.W ec a n
24This results from substituting (B6) into (B5).




because the ﬁrst expectation
is always positive and the second one can be postive or negative.
26We follow an analogous procedure under imperfect competition in the labor market.Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 29
solve for ct, gt and xt by substituting the values for ψt and µt into the system
(B3), (B4) and (1). The wage rate, wt, will be equal to the labor marginal
revenue and the price of land will be equal to the marginal productivity of
land. The debt price will be pinned down by (17). Labor income tax rate,
τt, is determined from (11). Finally, we compute the debt holdings, bt,f r o m
(B7). If bt is smaller than M and larger than M, we go to the next period.
Otherwise, we have to solve the variables as if we were in a constrained
period.
— For constrained periods, we set bt equal to M or to M. Then, ct, gt, xt,
ψt and µt are determined from (B3), (B4), (B6), (B7) and (1). Finally,
pb
t,w t,p `
t and τt are calculated as above.
• Step 3: Call {zt(δ0)} the series we got in the previous step. Then, calculate the
expressions inside the conditional expectations for {zt(δ0)} and run a non-linear
regression of these expressions on the functions ϕ1(.,st). We call the resulting
coeﬃcients S(δ0)
• Step 4: Update δ0 by: δ1 =( 1− η)δ0 + ηS(δ0) with η ∈ (0,1] and iterate the
procedure until a ﬁxed point is found, that is, δi = S(δi).
The algorithm has been implemented in GAUSS. We have computed the solutions
using 10,000 observations. In order to choose the proper degree for the polynomials we
have performed the accuracy tests proposed in Den Haan and Marcet (1989).Should Fiscal Policy Be Different in a Non-Competitive Framework? 30
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(• competitive model   s non-competitive model)                   Figure 2:  Impulse response functions. Incomplete markets for debt.
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